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INFORMATION  ABOUT  THE  AMOUNT of available  industrial  capacity  and 
about  the degree  of its utilization  are  employed  in many  forms  of economic 
analysis.  Data on utilization-operating  rates-have proven  useful  in ex- 
plaining  price  movements  and in forming  projections  of the future  course 
of business  capital  investment.  Less directly,  operating  rates  can help ex- 
plain the cyclical  behavior  of productivity  and, through  that, changes  in 
profits  and income  shares.  In some industries,  operating  rates  could con- 
tribute  to explanations  of the size of order  backlogs  and, at times, could 
offer  clues  to real  limitations  on the expansion  of output. 
Three  series  of indexes  on operating  rates are regularly  available  and 
widely  used.  They are  published  by the Federal  Reserve  Board,  McGraw- 
Hill, and  the Wharton  School.  Together  with  data  on output,  each  of these 
series  implies  an index  of capacity.  In addition,  a separately  estimated  index 
of capacity,  published  by McGraw-Hill,  can be used with output  data to 
provide  a fourth  measure  of operating  rates.  All of the four  measures  are 
available  for the manufacturing  sector as a whole. The Federal  Reserve 
Board  index  is also disaggregated  into a two-way  classification  of primary 
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processing  and advanced  processing  industries,  while the three other in- 
dexes  are  available  for finer  industry  breakdowns,  generally  at the standard 
industrial  classification  two-digit  industry  level. The main  purpose  of this 
paper  is to examine  these four measures. 
For a limited  number  of industries,  trade associations  compile  further 
information  on capacity.  Reoently  such data have been combined  by the 
Federal  Reserve  into an index of "capacity  utilization  in major  materials 
industries."'  The index  is a potentially  useful  addition  to the available  in- 
formation  about capacity  and deserves  scrutiny  by the profession.  How- 
ever,  it covers  only  a small  fraction  of all manufacturing  and  is not publicly 
available  for  the individual  industries  from  which  it is derived.  Thus,  it can- 
not be easily  evaluated  or used to check  the more  comprehensive  indexes 
just described,  although  some  casual  comparisons  are  reported  below. 
Finally,  numerous  attempts  have  been  made  to build  up  properly  weighted 
series  on capital  stocks  to serve  in much  the same  way  as capacity  measures 
in economic  analysis.2  In fact, capital  stocks are employed  in one part of 
the procedure  for developing  the Federal  Reserve  Board  capacity  index. 
However,  no measure  of capacity  or operating  rates  generated  entirely  from 
capital  stock  estimates  has come  into widespread  use and  none  is evaluated 
here. 
Recent  Developments 
An unusual  amount  of attention  has centered  on operating  rates  during 
the expansion  of 1971-73, particularly  since the outburst  of inflation  in 
1973.  In the six quarters  following  the introduction  of the new economic 
program  in 1971,  real gross  national  product  grew at an average  annual 
rate  of 7.2 percent.  Real  growth  exceeded  an 8 percent  rate  in the last quar- 
ter of 1972  and  the  first  quarter  of 1973.  This  extremely  rapid  expansion  led 
many  observers  to argue  that  the economy  was stretching  its available  pro- 
1. Nathan Edmonson,  "Capacity  Utilization  in Major  Materials  Industries,"  Federal 
Reserve  Bulletin,  Vol. 59 (August  1973),  pp. 564-66. The Federal  Reserve  had maintained 
such an index in the past, but had not done so for many  years before  Edmonson  recon- 
structed  it. 
2. A recent  attempt  is described  in Robert M. Coen and Bert G. Hickman,  "Aggre- 
gate Utilization Measures of Economic Performance,"  Memorandum  140 (Stanford 
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ductive  capacity  and that capacity  limits would restrain  subsequent  ex- 
pansion  and create  strong  inflationary  pressures  in the industrial  sector  of 
the economy.  In the second  and third  quarters  of 1973,  real GNP growth 
did  slow  substantially  from  its hectic  earlier  pace,  to an average  annual  rate 
of 3.0 percent,  at the  same  time  that  wholesale  prices  for  industrial  products 
rose rapidly. 
The capacity-limits  hypothesis  is a tempting  explanation  for these de- 
velopments.  However,  other  forces  were  at work  pushing  up prices  in this 
period:  the price  control program  had been substantially  weakened,  the 
dollar  was devalued  against  other  currencies,  and worldwide  commodity 
prices  were  soaring.  Against  this  background,  the price  acceleration  cannot 
be blamed  simplistically  on excessively  high operating  rates.  Nor is it pos- 
sible to identify  readily  the role, if any, of capacity  limitations  in slowing 
the growth  of real output  after  the first  quarter  of the year.  Consumption 
spending  alone accounts  fully for the deceleration  in GNP growth  in the 
second  quarter,  and  consumer  demand  is extremely  volatile  and  presumably 
was  restrained  by the sharp  rise  in prices  during  the period.  More  revealing, 
virtually  the entire  slowdown  in real  GNP between  the first  and  subsequent 
quarters  of 1973  is traceable  to output  in two sectors:  agriculture  and  auto- 
mobiles.  Aside  from  these  sectors,  real  GNP grew  at a 6 percent  rate  in both 
the first  and  third  quarters  and  at a 41/2  percent  rate  in the second.  Omitting 
the GNP produced  by other  minor  sectors  that have nothing  to do with 
U.S. capacity  limits-general government,  households  and  institutions,  and 
the rest  of the world-the annual  GNP growth  rate  in the remainder  of the 
economy  was  6.4  percent,  5.2  percent,  and  6.5 percent  in the  first  three  quar- 
ters of 1973,  respectively.  These  statistics  offer  little support  for a supply- 
limit hypothesis  of a slowdown.  On the other  hand,  the rate of inventory 
accumulation  in the second  and third  quarters  was lower  than most fore- 
casters  had predicted  and could constitute  evidence  of supply  constraints 
for some products. 
Operating  rates  have also been  the focus of attention  for forecasters  of 
plant and equipment  spending  in 1973,  and continue  to be an important 
clue to many  projections  of business  investment  for 1974.  High operating 
rates  have generally  produced  high levels of business  investment  outlays, 
and the extent  of such an investment  boom is one of the important  deter- 
minants  of the length  and strength  of any economic  expansion. 
Operating  rates,  then, promise  significant  clues to the most important 
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quite  different  stories.  For the second  quarter  of 1973,  the Federal  Reserve 
Board  reported  a rate of 83.4, McGraw-Hill's  utilization  rate index was 
86.9, Wharton  reported  96.4, and calculations  based  on the McGraw-Hill 
capacity  survey  indicated  an operating  rate of 81.4.3  Such a range  corre- 
sponds  to the difference  to be expected  in manufacturing  operating  rates 
between  the trough  and peak of a mild business  cycle.  There  is some am- 
biguity  about  whether  the levels of utilization  rates  in these measures  are 
directly  comparable.  Historical  evidence  presented  below  suggests  that  they 
are.  But  even  adjusting  the FRB and  McGraw-Hill  measures  by "preferred 
operating  rates"-the largest  adjustment  for  comparability  that  anyone  has 
suggested-still leaves a sizable discrepancy  among the measures.  For 
second  quarter  1973,  this  adjustment  puts  the FRB index  at 89.7,  the index 
from  the McGraw-Hill  utilization  survey  at 93.4,  and  calculations  based  on 
the McGraw-Hill  capacity  survey  at 87.5,  compared  with  96.4  for  Wharton. 
By these  measures,  the Federal  Reserve  index  and  the McGraw-Hill  capac- 
ity survey  indicated  ample  spare  capacity,  but  the  Wharton  index  suggested 
that a wide  range  of manufacturing  industries  were  pushing  against  capac- 
ity limits.  The  answer  to the crucial  question  of how  much  unused  capacity 
exists  in American  industry  depends  to an altogether  unacceptable  degree 
on which  of the widely  used measures  one looks at. 
Alternative  Measures  of Capacity 
No one concept  of capacity  has general  acceptance.  Very  loosely,  capac- 
ity is meant  to measure  the output  that can be produced  with  the available 
stock  of plant  and  equipment.  This  level of output  depends  on the amount 
of other  inputs  used with the capital  and on changing  technical  relation- 
ships  that define  how the inputs  are  combined  and how much  output  they 
will produce  in various  combinations.  If the mix of output  varies,  and if 
capital  is specialized  in its uses,  the relation  is complicated  further.  Finally, 
a given  physical  facility  can  be utilized  more  or  less  fully  by operating  more 
or fewer  shifts  and longer  or shorter  workweeks. 
None of the indexes  attempts  to narrow  this range  of ambiguity  by de- 
3. The McGraw-Hill  measures  analyzed  here  are available  as end-of-year  data. Esti- 
mates for periods within the year are made by the author by interpolating  capacity 
growth between  its yearly  end-points.  For 1973 quarters,  capacity is estimated  for this 
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fining  its concept of capacity.  Plainly,  all of them refer  to a reasonably 
"normal"  form  of operation:  They  do not measure  what  could  be produced 
by a fully war-mobilized  economy.  Nor can they measure  what limits  to 
total production  might  arise  from serious  bottlenecks  in one or more  key 
industries.  The emerging  fuel shortage  threatens  to limit  total output  in a 
way  that could  not be measured  by any  capacity  index.  There  is some  evi- 
dence  that the measures  refer  to production  near  a minimum  average  cost 
point on a cost curve.4  In the absence  of a more  precise  definition,  the sav- 
ing feature  of any of the present  capacity  and utilization  indexes  must  be 
the assumption  (warranted,  one hopes)  that  the index  is consistent  through 
time so that at least  it is always  measuring  the same-if  unspecified-con- 
cept.  The  usefulness  of the measure  can  then  emerge  in its ability  to predict. 
The available  indexes  of manufacturing  capacity  are  based  on distinctly 
different  approaches  to measurement.  McGraw-Hill  surveys  firms  directly 
about their capacity  and operating  rates.  The Wharton  analysts  estimate 
capacity  by looking  directly  at the amount  produced.  The  Federal  Reserve 
Board  combines  information  from the McGraw-Hill  surveys  with heroic 
assumptions  about  the relation  between  capital  stock  estimates  and  capac- 
ity. The way each of the measures  is formally  constructed  can be briefly 
described. 
MCGRAW-HILL  SURVEYS 
The  Economics  Department  of the McGraw-Hill  Publications  Company 
compiles  information  on investment  plans,  capacity  growth,  and operating 
rates  from  the responses  of individual  companies  to survey  questions.  The 
sample  of firms  surveyed  in 1972  accounted  for 63 percent  of total capital 
investment,  41 percent  of sales, and 38 percent  of employment  in manu- 
facturing.5  While  companies  that participate  in the survey  are usually  the 
larger  firms  in their  industries,  an attempt  is made  to provide  a representa- 
tive cross-section  of firms,  and the survey  responses  are  blown  up  to make 
4. Testimony  of Lawrence  R. Klein, in Measures  of Productive  Capacity,  Hearings 
before the Subcommittee  on Economic Statistics of the Joint Economic Committee, 
87 Cong. 2 sess. (1962), pp. 61-63. 
5. The McGraw-Hill  survey  and the indexes  reviewed  here  are described  in "Business' 
Plans for New Plants and Equipment,  1972-75," 25th Annual McGraw-Hill Survey 
(McGraw-Hill  Publications  Company, Economics Department,  April 28, 1972; pro- 
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them  directly  comparable  with government  statistics  for each  industry.  To 
obtain  more  aggregated  estimates,  individual  industries  are  combined  using 
weights  from  the index  of industrial  production.6 
McGraw-Hill  does not define  capacity  or operating  rates,  and firms  re- 
spond according  to their own definitions.  Firms also indicate  what their 
"preferred  operating  rates"  are,  and again  McGraw-Hill  does not attempt 
to define  the concept.  The  capacity  survey  asks  firms  about  both  their  plans 
for additions  to capacity  in the current  year and their actual  additions  in 
the previous  year.  The  analysis  in this  paper  is based  on the actual  additions 
to capacity  that firms  have reported. 
The  McGraw-Hill  series  on additions  to capacity  and  on operating  rates 
are  separate  and  independent  from  one another.  The  level  of capacity  indi- 
cated  by the one cannot  be divided  into a measure  of output  for the indus- 
try to obtain  the operating  rate  provided  by the other.  The survey  on op- 
erating  rates  refers  to December  of each  year  and  in the present  analysis  is 
treated  as an average  operating  rate for the entire  month.  Thus,  when  di- 
vided into seasonally  adjusted  output  for December  as measured  by the 
Federal  Reserve  Board's  index of industrial  production,  this series  yields 
an estimate  of capacity  for that month. 
The  McGraw-Hill  capacity  survey  is not benchmarked  to a level  of utili- 
zation  rates.  Capacity  in each  industry  is an index  number  equal  to 100  in 
1967.  Dividing  this index  into output  yields  a utilization  index.  In the pres- 
ent analysis,  this utilization  index  for each  industry  was  then  scaled  so that 
its average  over  the entire  data period  equaled  the average  rate from the 
McGraw-Hill  utilization  survey  for the corresponding  industry. 
Both of the McGraw-Hill  measures  are subject  to the normal  technical 
problems  of survey  sampling.  By  the nature  of what  they  measure,  they  can 
also be suspected  of having  certain  distinctive  strengths  and weaknesses. 
Estimates  from  the capacity  survey  suffer  from  having  no periodic  bench- 
mark, so that any systematic  error  in the annual  estimates  of capacity 
growth  will cumulate.  By contrast,  errors  in estimates  of capacity  growth 
from  the operating  rate  survey  are  unlikely  to cumulate  since  new  operating 
rate  benchmarks  are  provided  annually.  This  survey,  however,  could  suffer 
from  a cyclical  bias if respondents  treated  marginal  facilities  differently  at 
6. Aggregation  should be made using capacity weights rather  than output weights. 
However, all the measures  reviewed  have used some form of output or value-added 
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different  stages of the cycle, say, by ignoring  some idle facilities  in esti- 
mating  operating  rates  during  slack  periods  but counting  them  when  they 
were  put back into use. 
FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD  INDEX 
The  Federal  Reserve  Board  index  of manufacturing  capacity  is the most 
eclectic  of the indexes  in construction,  relying  on three  distinct  sources  of 
information.  The  data  from  these  sources  are  combined  in a way  that aims 
to utilize  the best features  of each set and minimize  its weaknesses.  The 
FRB methodology  relies on the McGraw-Hill  utilization  rate survey  to 
benchmark  its capacity  index over the longer run. However,  to estimate 
year-to-year  changes in capacity, it uses two indicators  of short-term 
capacity  growth:  year-to-year  changes  in the McGraw-Hill  capacity  survey 
and estimates  of the size of the capital  stock.  The  FRB index  merges  these 
three  kinds of information  on capacity  growth  by estimating  the historic 
relationship  between  the two short-run  indicators  and the utilization  rate 
survey. 
The historic  drift  in capacity  between  the two McGraw-Hill  surveys  is 
estimated  by time trends.  The time trend  for the latest  interval  is then ap- 
plied  to the estimates  from  the capacity  survey  to provide  one estimate  of 
yearly  capacity  growth.  The same  procedure  is used to establish  the time 
trend  of the drift  between  the capital  stock and capacity  calculated  from 
the utilization  survey.  This  time  trend  is then  applied  to the annual  growth 
of the capital  stock to provide  a second  estimate  of capacity  growth  year 
by year.  These  two estimates  of yearly  capacity  growth-one from  the drift- 
adjusted  capacity  survey  and  one from  the drift-adjusted  capital  stock-are 
then  averaged  to provide  the final  FRB capacity  index.  Quarterly  estimates 
are  interpolated  from  yearly  estimates;  and  quarterly  estimates  of capacity 
utilization  are  derived  by dividing  capacity  into the FRB industrial  produc- 
tion index.7 
A serious  weakness  of the FRB index  is that the benchmarking  to the 
utilization  survey  is based  on historic  statistical  relationships  that are  sim- 
ple at best and that may change  substantially.  In particular,  estimates  for 
recent  years  are based  on simple  time trend  estimates  of the drift  that are 
7. The most thorough  published  description  of the index and its construction  is given 
in Frank de Leeuw, "A Revised Index of Manufacturing  Capacity,"  Federal  Reserve 
Bulletin,  Vol. 52 (November 1966), pp. 1605-15. 708  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1973 
heavily  weighted  with historical  information.  The estimates  are not cur- 
rently  updated;8  and even if they were, they would still not adequately 
reflect  any abrupt  recent  changes  in the relation  of investment  and capital 
stock to capacity  or in the bias in the McGraw-Hill  capacity  series. 
THE  WHARTON  INDEX 
The Wharton  measure  of capacity  is produced  by an extremely  simple 
procedure.  Seasonally  adjusted  quarterly  data on output  for each of the 
two-digit  manufacturing  industries  are  recorded  to determine  peak  quarters 
of output,  and  output  at the  peaks  are  taken  as measures  of capacity  in each 
industry.  Between  successive  peaks,  capacity  is assumed  to grow along a 
straight-line  path connecting  them. For the period  after  the most recent 
peak,  capacity  is assumed  to grow  along  the same  straight  line that it fol- 
lowed  before  that peak.  If output  subsequently  goes above  this line, a new 
capacity  estimate  is defined  by that level of output,  and a final  estimate  is 
established  when output eventually  turns down. Thus at no time does 
utilization  exceed  100,  and it reaches  100  at every  cyclical  peak. Some  ex- 
ceptional  cases  are  dealt  with  separately,  such  as a peak  followed  by a brief 
decline  and a return  of output  to new  highs,  or a declining  industry  whose 
output  achieves  local peaks  that lie below  previous  peaks.  In arriving  at a 
capacity  measure  for  all  manufacturing,  individual  industries  are  aggregated 
using  value-added  weights. 
On one occasion,  Klein and Preston  checked  the estimates  of capacity 
based on the basic Wharton  methodology  by comparing  them with esti- 
mates  from  a production  function  for several  individual  industries.9  In light 
of evidence  that some  of the basic  Wharton  series  were  drifting  away  from 
the production  function  estimates,  the Wharton  index was adjusted  up- 
ward  through  1960.  Wharton  capacity  estimates  for later  years  have been 
made  with  the basic  methodology.'0 
The obvious  drawback  to the Wharton  methodology  is its treatment  of 
8. The most recent  estimates  of the drift use data through 1970. 
9. L. R. Klein and R. S. Preston,  "Some New Results  in the Measurement  of Capac- 
ity Utilization,"  American Economic Review, Vol.  57 (March  1967), pp. 34-58. 
10. The basic methodology  is not considered  sacred  and apparently  some of the esti- 
mates have occasionally  been amended.  However, the index is constructed  essentially 
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every  peak  in output  as a point of "full  utilization."  The criticism  that  the 
1959-60  output  peak  clearly  should  not have been regarded  as a point of 
full utilization  spurred  the adjustment  to the series  just described.  And in 
their analysis,  Klein and Preston  concluded  that the adjustment  was re- 
quired  because  the output  peaks  in the early  1950s  represented  overutiliza- 
tion for purposes  of the Wharton  index as well as because  the 1959-60 
peaks  were  periods  of less than full utilization.1'  Since,  for individual  in- 
dustries,  operating  rates  at peaks  are  defined  to be 100,  the basic  Wharton 
methodology  cannot distinguish  differences  in the intensity  of utilization 
from one peak  to another.  The peak operating  rate  for all manufacturing 
or some other  aggregation  will be less than 100  since  all industries  do not 
peak  in the same  quarter.  Thus  peak  operating  rates  for  manufacturing  can 
differ  from cycle to cycle because  of differences  in the distribution  of in- 
dividual  industry  peaks  in time,  but not because  the intensity  of utilization 
at those industry  peaks  is measured  to be different. 
Because  the most recent  estimate  of capacity  in the Wharton  methodol- 
ogy is provisional  until a peak  in output  is reached,  another  drawback  of 
the Wharton  methodology  is that current  estimates  of capacity  and op- 
erating  rates  are  always  subject  to revision  depending  on the course  of out- 
put. If output  exceeds  the capacity  line extrapolated  from  the most recent 
peak, capacity  will be defined  to coincide  with output  until output  slows 
and a new peak is established  to define  capacity  for the present  cycle. 
Retrospectively,  operating  rates initially  reported  as 100 may be revised 
downward  substantially.  Conversely,  if output  expands  weakly  and peaks 
before  reaching  the capacity  line  that  had  been  extrapolated  from  the most 
recent  peak,  initially  reported  operating  rates  will  be revised  upward.  Quar- 
ters  in which  spare  capacity  was initially  reported  to have  been ample  will 
historically  be shown to have been periods  of full utilization.  Thus the 
Wharton  index  can  tell different  stories  to the  researcher  using  it historically 
and to the decision  maker  using  it currently. 
The simplicity  of the Wharton  methodology  is also its great strength. 
The technique  is easily applied  and yields prompt  estimates  of capacity 
utilization  over  a wide  range  of industries.  In recent  years,  it has been  ap- 
plied to data on industrial  production  in many countries  other  than the 
United  States  to produce  historic  and  current  estimates  of utilization.  While 
11. "Some New Results,"  pp. 54-55. 710  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1973 
its drawbacks  are unmistakable,  the Wharton  index may serve  very well 
where  a measure  of changes  in utilization  rates over  relatively  short  time 
intervals  is useful. 
Characteristics  of the Measures 
Several  characteristics  of these  four  measures  of manufacturing  capacity 
and utilization  can be examined  by comparing  their  past behavior.  Some 
of the findings  from  this examination  are suggested  by the descriptions  of 
how the several  measures  are  constructed  and how they have  been  utilized 
in the past. But there  are also a few surprises. 
CYCLICAL  BIAS 
Table 1 shows regression  estimates  summarizing  the relation  between 
capacity  as estimated  by the four alternative  measures  and  two other  vari- 
ables, output  and the capital  stock. All variables  are in logarithmic  form 
and  thus  summarize  the relation  between  changes  in output  and  in the cap- 
ital stock and changes  in the capacity  measure.  Separate  estimates  are 
shown  for the 1954-65  and 1966-72  periods.  A variety  of evidence,  includ- 
ing  the  regression  estimates  of Table  1  themselves,  point  to a change  around 
the mid-sixties  in the relation  among  the four  measures  of capacity  and in 
the relation  between  two of the measures  and investment  or the capital 
stock.  The form  of the equation  does not represent  any structural  hypoth- 
esis, but rather  offers  a preliminary  way to view the characteristics  of the 
several  capacity  measures. 
The  principal  result  of interest  is the significant  positive  relationship  be- 
tween  output  changes  and  changes  in capacity  as measured  by the  McGraw- 
Hill utilization  survey.  The estimated  effect  is virtually  identical  in both 
regression  periods.  There  is no important  relation  between  current  output 
and current  capacity  for any of the other measures.  Since output enters 
without  a lag, and since  variation  in the capital  stock  should  capture  much 
of the true variation  in capacity,  it is extremely  doubtful  that this relation 
between  output  and  capacity  represents  a genuine  case of rising  output  in- 
ducing  capacity  growth.  Rather,  capacity  as measured  from  the utilization George L. Perry  711 
Table  1. Relation  between  Manufacturing  Capacity,  Output,  and 
Capital  Stock,  Measured  by Four  Indexes,  1954-65  and  1966-72a 
Coefficient  estimatesb  Standard  Durbin- 
error  of  Watson 
Index  Period  a  b  c  estimate  R2  statistic 
McGraw-Hill  Cc  1954-65  -22.2  0.08  1.38  0.015  0.992  1.0 
(-12.3)  (1.1)  (12.6) 
1966-72  -21.5  0.12  1.34  0.016  0.980  0.9 
(-12.4)  (0.8)  (12.2) 
McGraw-Hill  Uc  1954-65  -16.2  0.23  1.03  0.009  0.996  2.9 
(-13.9)  (4.9)  (14.5) 
1966-72  -11.6  0.23  0.80  0.004  0.997  2.0 
(-24.7)  (5.7)  (27.0) 
Wharton  1954-65  -26.7  0.05  1.38  0.015  0.990  0.7 
(-14.1)  (0.7)  (11.9) 
1966-72  -17.2  0.02  0.89  0.008  0.988  1.0 
(-19.8)  (0.3)  (16.3) 
Federal Reserve  1954-65  -21.7  0.05  1.37  0.007  0.998  0.7 
Board  (-26.1)  (1.4)  (26.9) 
1966-72  -20.8  0.01  1.32  0.001  0.996  1.3 
(-29.0)  (0.1)  (29.4) 
Sources:  Capacity indexes  are from  McGraw-Hill Publications Company,  Economics  Department, 
"Annual Survey of U.S. Business' Plans for New Plants and Equipment," April 1973 and preceding  annual 
issues; Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, University of Pennsylvania, Economic Research Unit, 
"United States Aggregate Industrial Capacity Utilitization Rates" (July and September 1973; computer 
printouts); Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (computer cards). Industrial production and 
capital stock data were provided by the Federal Reserve System. 
a.  The data are observations for  the fourth quarter of  each year. The numbers in  parentheses are 
t-statistics. 
b.  The estimating equation is 
In C = a +  b In Q +  c In K, 
where 
C = capacity measure, last quarter  of each year 
Q = Federal Reserve index of industrial production in manufacturing 
K = capital stock. 
c.  Here and  in  the following  tables McGraw-Hill-C  and  McGraw-Hill-U  are indexes based  on 
McGraw-Hill capacity and utilization surveys, respectively. 
survey  does seem  to have  a cyclical  bias.  It appears  that  respondents  "find" 
capacity  when  output  rises  sharply,  and "lose"  it when  output  slackens. 
It is not clear  whether  the results  reflect  simply  a bias of respondents  to 
the survey,  or the thinking  of management  about how much capacity  is 
actually  available.  If they reflect  the thinking  of decision  makers,  then a 
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put expanded  and new capacity  was "discovered"  could still produce  the 
economic  consequences  of tight  capacity.  The  index  with  cyclical  bias  could 
predict  well.  Indeed,  since  most  economic  developments  one  would  forecast 
using  utilization  rates  are  just as cyclical  as the bias  in the index  is, predic- 
tions  could  be expected  to be little  affected  by the bias,  whatever  its source. 
The estimated  elasticity  between  output  and capacity  measured  by the 
utilization  survey  is about one-quarter.  Thus, assuming  any given actual 
growth  in capacity,  if output  were  to grow 8 percent  rather  than zero  in a 
given  year,  the utilization  survey  would  indicate  a 2 percent  difference  in 
capacity  growth  and  a corresponding  two-point  narrower  spread  in utiliza- 
tion  rates  than  actually  would  characterize  the  two alternative  output  paths. 
For individual  years,  there  is some evidence  that the bias  may have  been 
noticeably  larger:  in 1966,  the survey  indicated  a growth  in capacity  of 
more than 10 percent,  and in 1970, a growth  of only 0.3 percent.  If, as 
seems  reasonable,  capacity  is interpreted  as the quantities  that firms  find 
they can produce  when  actually  put to the test, the utilization  survey  esti- 
mates  are  most reliable  at high  levels  of utilization,  and  comparisons  with 
other  indexes  are  best made  for such  periods. 
This  finding  also  validates  the use of the utilization  survey  to benchmark 
information  about  capacity  levels  in the FRB index  while  other  measures 
are  used  to estimate  year-to-year  changes  in the index.  However,  the FRB 
methodology  of estimating  time trends  among  the different  measures  may 
not be optimal,  since  for  relatively  short  time  intervals,  a trend  estimate  can 
be too much  influenced  by a few observations.  It might  be better  to bench- 
mark  to estimates  from  the utilization  survey  at its latest  peak.  Even  better 
might  be adjustment  of the capacity  implied  by the utilization  survey  with 
an equation  such  as that  in Table  1 and  application  of the adjusted  estimate 
to correct  the drift  in the other  inputs  of the FRB index. 
The  other  result  of interest  in Table  1 is the change  in the relation  of cap- 
ital stock growth  to capacity  growth  between  the two periods  for the util- 
ization  survey  index  and  the Wharton  index.  The relation  is little  changed 
between  the two periods  for the other  capacity  indexes.  Since  some  drift  is 
expected  between  measures  of capital  stock growth  and capacity,  and the 
timing  between  the two is not known  accurately,  no great  significance  is 
attached  to the differences  in coefficients  among  the measures.  But  the de- 
cline  in the estimated  elasticity  between  periods  in two of the  measures  does 
correspond  to the hypothesis  that pollution  control efforts,  and possibly 
other  developments,  have reduced  the annual  increment  to capacity  that George L. Perry  713 
goes along  with a given  level of investment  spending.  The size of the effect 
is substantial.  According  to the estimates  for the utilization  survey  index, 
to achieve  a given  percentage  increase  in capacity  now requires  25 percent 
faster  growth  in the capital  stock-roughly equivalent  to 10 percent  more 
gross investment-than it used to. The effect estimated  for the Wharton 
index  is even greater. 
GROWTH  IN  CAPACITY 
In Table  2, the growth  in manufacturing  capacity,  as measured  by the 
four alternative  indexes,  is shown for different  intervals  since the mid- 
1950s.  The capacity  measures  are for the end of each year, and the end 
points  of the intervals  shown  correspond  approximately  to cyclical  peaks  in 
output.  Average  capacity  growth  rates  were  not far apart  in the four  mea- 
sures  for the decade  from  the end of 1956  to the end of 1966.  But in the 
1966-72 period, they diverge substantially.  The FRB index and the 
McGraw-Hill  capacity  survey  record  a speedup  in capacity  growth  while 
the McGraw-Hill  utilization  survey  and Wharton  record  slowdowns.  This 
divergence  coincides  with the changes  in the relation  of the capital  stock 
to the various  measures  of capacity  implied  in Table 1. 
The growth  rates  for the smaller  subintervals  shown  in the second  part 
of the table  are  more  erratic,  particularly  for the McGraw-Hill  utilization 
measure  during  the first  decade.  Allowing  for  the cyclical  bias  that  has  been 
identified  in this index  smooths  the picture  considerably.  Over  the 1956-60 
interval,  output grew at an average  annual  rate of only 0.6 percent;  it 
accelerated  to an 8.1 percent  growth  rate over the 1960-66 interval.  The 
Table  2. Growth  Rates  in Manufacturing  Capacity,  as Measured  by Four 
Indexes,  1956-66,  1966-72,  and  Subintervals 
Average  percent  per year 
Intervalsa  Subintervalsa 
Index  1956-66  1966-72  1956-60  1960-66  1966-69  1969-72 
Federal  Reserve  Board  4.6  5.0  4.3  4.8  6.0  4.0 
McGraw-Hill-C  4.7  5.4  4.7  4.7  5.6  5.1 
McGraw-Hill-U  4.7  3.7  2.7  6.0  4.8  2.6 
Wharton  4.3  3.5  4.8  4.0  3.8  3.2 
Sources: Same as Table 1. 
a.  Capacity was estimated for the fourth quarter of each year, except for the McGraw-Hill measures, 
which are for December of the years shown, CON 
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indicated regression adjustment to  the  capacity growth estimate would 
narrow the speedup of 3.3 percentage points shown between the two inter- 
vals to about 1.6 points. On an adjusted basis, the capacity growth rates in 
this index for the two periods would be about 3.7 percent and 5.3 percent. 
The growth rate in the Wharton index slows successively in each of the 
subintervals; the deceleration during the first decade seems particularly 
implausible. Investment  incentives were introduced in 1962 and contributed 
to a spectacular rise in investment spending and a marked acceleration in 
the growth of the capital stock. While a translation of this development into 
a capacity estimate cannot be made with any precision, it seems unlikely 
that capacity growth would have slowed in this period. 
The adjustment to the Wharton index that was made through 1960 put 
its growth rate up to that point in line with those of the other measures. 
But as a result of lagging the others noticeably after that time, Wharton 
utilization rates were substantially higher at the 1966 and 1969 peaks than 
those recorded by the other measures:12 
Index  1966  1969 
Wharton  96.1  96.2 
McGraw-Hill-U  90.0  85.8 
McGraw-Hill-C  91.5  87.3 
Federal  Reserve  Board  92.3  87.1 
The divergences starting in the mid-1960s can be seen in Figure 1, which 
charts historical utilization rates for all four measures. Curiously, a dis- 
proportionate amount of the departure  of Wharton from the other indexes 
occurs in one year, 1966. 
PREFERRED  OPERATING  RATES 
The usefulness of any index of operating rates can be judged from its 
performance as an economic time series. The absolute level of the series 
need not have any well-defined meaning. But for purposes of comparing 
one index with another, it is useful to know how their levels are expected 
to be related. The Federal Reserve index was explicitly benchmarked  to the 
McGraw-Hill utilization survey when it was constructed, so no adjustment 
12. Peaks did not occur in exactly  the same quarters  for all measures.  The operating 
rates given are for the second quarters  of 1966 and 1969. 716  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1973 
is needed  in comparing  their operating  rates.  The McGraw-Hill  capacity 
survey  yields  only an index  number  of capacity  levels  that, for the present 
study,  has  been  benchmarked  to average  the same  as the utilization  survey. 
Thus,  of the four  indexes  under  review,  only the McGraw-Hill  utilization 
survey  and  the Wharton  index  produce  independent  estimates  of the level 
of operating  rates.  It is useful  to know  how they should  be related. 
Respondents  to the McGraw-Hill  utilization  survey  indicate a "pre- 
ferred"  level of operating  rate as well as an actual  level in each period. 
Analysts  have often  suggested  that actual  rates  should  be adjusted  by pre- 
ferred  rates  for the purpose  of comparing  the estimates  from  the McGraw- 
Hill survey  with those from  Wharton13-in  other  words,  that the level of 
the Wharton  index  should  be comparable  with the level of the utilization 
survey  as a fraction  of the preferred  operating  rate the survey  reports. 
However  intuitively  appealing  such a simple  adjustment  may be, the his- 
tory of the two measures  does not support  its application. 
The data below show the ratio of operating  rates in the McGraw-Hill 
survey  to those estimated  by Wharton  for periods  starting  with the first 
year for which the survey  was available-1954-and  ending with every 
year since 1965.  As of the mid-1960s,  the average  level of operating  rates 
reported  by the two series  was  virtually  identical.  The  ratio  between  the two 
declines  every  year  as the period  is extended  from 1965  to the present.  This 
occurs  because  the Wharton  index  rose substantially  above  the McGraw- 
Hill in 1966  and  stayed  above  it thereafter.  As a result,  for the seven  years 
from 1966  to 1972,  the McGraw-Hill  index  (for December)  averaged  only 
90.8 percent  of the Wharton  index  (for the fourth  quarter): 
McGraw-Hill  operating 
rate as a percentage 
Period  of Wharton  rate 
1954  to: 
1965  100.4 
1966  99.6 
1967  99.0 
1968  98.3 
1969  97.6 
1970  97.4 
1971  97.0 
1972  96.7 
13. See, for instance,  Klein's  comment  in Measures  of Productive  Capacity,  pp. 56-57. George L. Perry  717 
The average relation between the two measures  through the mid-1960s is 
appropriate  for comparing the indexes. The Wharton index was examined 
and revised at about that time.14  Furthermore,  the recent and current evi- 
dence on operating rates is best examined using evidence about the relation 
between the two measures established from previous years. However, even 
if the ratio of the two measures  up to 1972-96.7-were  used to make them 
comparable, such a procedure  would still imply a much smaller adjustment 
than adjusting by the preferred  rate reported by McGraw-Hill, which was 
93 in 1972 for all manufacturing. 
An examination of individual industries reported in both surveys sup- 
ports the conclusion that no level adjustment is required  between the two. 
By 1968, when the average ratio over the 1954-68 period was still 98.3 per- 
cent in all manufacturing, the  1954-68 average McGraw-Hill operating 
rate exceeded the average Wharton operating rate over the same period in 
five of the eleven individual industries. Thus there is simply no evidence 
that over most of the history of the two surveys  the levels of operating rates 
they report  should not be compared directly, either at the all-manufacturing 
level or at some level of disaggregation. Adjusting the McGraw-Hill index 
by its  preferred operating rate would bring operating rates in the two 
measures closer together for the most recent years, but only at the expense 
of moving them further apart in earlier periods. 
OPERATING  RATE  CORRELATIONS 
Despite the differences among the  four measures already cited, their 
measures of  operating rates are highly correlated, even over the whole 
1954-72 period. The correlation of the Wharton index with the others is 
clearly the weakest. But as the marked divergence of the Wharton index 
from the others occurs rather abruptly in the mid-1960s, the Wharton cor- 
relations are much higher if the whole period is divided into two parts. 
When the period is separated into intervals covering fourth quarter 1954 
to fourth quarter 1965 and first quarter 1966 to fourth quarter 1972, the 
Wharton correlations rise substantially and become virtually indistinguish- 
able from the correlations among the other measures. These correlations 
are presented in Table 3. 
Correlating operating rates is a weak test of the similarity of the indexes 
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Table  3. Correlation  Matrix  of Manufacturing  Operating  Rates 
among  Four  Indexes,  1954-72,  and  Subperiods 
Index 
McGraw-  McGraw-  Federal 
Index  Hill-U  Hill-C  Wharton  Reserve  Board 
1954:4  to 1972:4 
McGraw-Hill-U  1.00 
McGraw-Hill-C  0.93  1.00 
Wharton  0.73  0.71  1.00 
Federal  Reserve  Board  0.96  0.99  0.75  1.00 
1954:4 to 1965:4 
McGraw-Hill-U  1.00 
McGraw-Hill-C  0.94  1.00 
Wharton  0.94  0.99  1.00 
Federal  Reserve  Board  0.97  0.98  0.99  1.00 
1966:1 to 1972:4 
McGraw-Hill-U  1.00 
McGraw-Hill-C  0.95  1.00 
Wharton  0.94  0.92  1.00 
Federal  Reserve  Board  0.97  0.99  0.93  1.00 
Sources: Same as Table 1. 
since  all four  measures  have  industrial  production  as a common  numerator. 
The correlations  do show that despite  their differences,  all four are  likely 
to be useful  for  many  purposes.  At a minimum,  they  must  all gauge  cyclical 
variations  with some success,  measuring  differences  between  years  of high 
and  low utilization  that  follow  one  another  fairly  closely.  Since  the  measures 
have  been  shown  to drift  substantially  apart  over  time, however,  they  can- 
not be comparably  successful  in answering  harder questions, such as 
whether  operating  rates  in 1972  were  already  near  peak  levels. 
Recent  Hazards  for Estimating  Capacity 
Much  of the preceding  analysis  points  up the fact  that alternative  capac- 
ity estimates  have  been agreeing  less with one another  since  the mid-1960s 
than  they  used  to. Coinciding  with  this  development  are  several  occurrences 
in the economy  that may have  posed special  difficulties  for capacity  mea- 
surements.  Two of these,  about  which  only a little can be said  here,  are  the 
acceleration  of wages  and  the striking  changes  in competitiveness  between 
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The acceleration  in wages of the late 1960s and 1970s  is sometimes 
thought  to have  spurred  more  capital-intensive  production  techniques  and 
hence  to have altered  the relation  between  the capital  stock and capacity. 
If the prices  of capital  goods reflect  actual  wage  levels-which they prob- 
ably  do-and  if costs of financial  capital  reflect  expected  wage  increases- 
which  is much  less certain-no shifts  in production  techniques  would be 
predicted  simply  from  the onset  of inflation.  It is beyond  the present  analy- 
sis to judge whether  in the real world of recent  years, inflation  in fact 
affected  production  techniques  and capacity  growth. 
Changes  in international  competitiveness  have been striking  and could 
well have affected  economic  capacity  in U.S. industries.  A concentrated 
oligopolistic  industry  such  as steel  has been  subjected  to competitive  pres- 
sure  from  imports  produced  by  technically  more  advanced  facilities  abroad. 
Modernization  of the  U.S. facilities  also  may  have  been  profitable  for some 
time; but they were  not treated  as obsolete  until foreign  competition  in- 
truded.  More generally,  the inroads  of foreign  competition  in particular 
lines can make  U.S. capacity  obsolete  even  in competitive  sectors.  But as 
pervasive  as such  a development  may  appear  to be, if the newest  technology 
is available  to U.S. producers,  the presence  of foreign  competition  itself  is 
not the key to accelerated  obsolescence.  The key is a slower  rise in unit 
labor  costs abroad  than  here  because  of greater  moderation  of wages  rela- 
tive to productivity  growth.  The importance  of this factor  cannot  be an- 
alyzed  further  here, and it is hard even to speculate  about which of the 
available  measures  of capacity  might  most successfully  detect  obsolescence 
from  this source. 
THE  ANTIPOLLUTION  DRIVE 
Somewhat  more  can be said about  a third  development  in the economy 
over this recent  period  that may have posed special  difficulties  for some 
ways  of measuring  capacity:  the intensified  drive  to reduce  environmental 
pollution  from  industrial  sources. 
In recent  years,  a great  deal of public  attention  has been  focused  on the 
problems  of polluted  air  and  water.  Industry  has been  identified  as a major 
source  of pollution and has been the object of intensified  antipollution 
efforts.  These  efforts  have  the effect  of altering  historically  estimated  mea- 
sures  of the capital  stock and industrial  capacity  at both ends of the pro- 
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investment  expenditures  are  made  for the purpose  of cleaning  up produc- 
tion processes,  investment  will add less to capacity  than it has added 
historically,  and less to the capital stock conceived  as a means of aug- 
menting  production.  And to the extent  that some facilities  are abandoned 
ahead  of schedule  because  they  cannot  economically  be altered  to conform 
to new  environmental  standards,  the capital  stock  and  capacity  are  reduced 
by retirement  more  quickly  than  historical  experience  would  predict. 
Since  1967,  McGraw-Hill  has surveyed  firms  to determine  the amount  of 
investment  expenditures  being  devoted  to pollution  abatement.  According 
to these surveys,  such expenditures  have risen  from $785 million  in 1967 
to $2.6 billion  in 1972  for the manufacturing  sector  as a whole, and rep- 
resented  about  8 percent  of total  plant  and  equipment  outlays  by manufac- 
turing  firms  in the later  year.15 
A good deal of ambiguity  surrounds  the McGraw-Hill  estimates.  Some 
firms  may report  new facilities  that meet  pollution  standards  as pollution 
control  measures  even  though  they  are  also  additions  to the firm's  capacity. 
I know of no way to make an allowance  for this possibility.  But on the 
assumption  that the outlays  reported  by McGraw-Hill  are exclusively  for 
pollution  control  and do not add to capacity,  an estimate  of the bias in a 
capital  stock  measure  such as that used in constructing  the FRB capacity 
index  can be made.  I have  done  this for the two subgroups  of manufactur- 
ing for which  separate  indexes  are presented,  advanced  and primary  pro- 
cessing industries.  The McGraw-Hill  estimates  of outlays for pollution 
control  were  calculated  for these  two industry  groups  and  subtracted  from 
total investment  outlays  in each group for each year. New estimates  of 
capital  stock  were  then generated  by deflating  this reduced  level of invest- 
ment spending,  and these new estimates  were translated  into capacity 
figures  by means  of the FRB formulas. 
By the end of 1972,  according  to these calculations,  the portion  of the 
FRB capacity  measure  that  is generated  using  investment  and  capital  stock 
estimates  was  3.3 percent  too high  in the primary  processing  industries  and 
1.5 percent  too high in the advanced  processing  industries.  Since  the FRB 
capacity  estimates  use the McGraw-Hill  capacity  survey  together with 
these  capital  stock estimates,  the actual  FRB capacity  index  would  be off 
by only half these amounts  on the basis of this one adjustment.  And if 
some part of the outlays  identified  with pollution  abatement  also add to 
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capacity,  the  importance  of this  adjustment  for  the aggregates  that  the FRB 
uses  must  be regarded  as small.  For individual  industries,  the effect  could 
be considerably  larger.  But if the pollution  control  movement  has had an 
important  effect  on industrial  capacity  over a range  of industries,  it must 
have come by the other route-by  forcing early retirement  of existing 
facilities. 
There  are  no direct  measures  of the retirement  or obsolescence  of capital 
facilities.  Historical  estimates  are available  on average  lives of various 
types of capital  and these are used  in empirical  investigations  such as the 
FRB capacity  index.  But they offer  no warning  of changes  in typical  his- 
torical  patterns.  In principle,  some  of the capacity  estimates  that are  under 
review  would  be capable  of detecting  such  changes.  If output  peaks  were 
always  caused  by capacity  limitations,  the Wharton  methodology  would 
detect  them along with other  influences  on capacity  growth.  The half of 
the FRB capacity  measure  that rests  on a historical  relation  between  cap- 
ital stock and capacity  could  not detect  such a change.  And one can only 
hypothesize  that respondents  to the McGraw-Hill  surveys  take proper 
account  of this source  of change  in their  capacity.  It could  be that the ca- 
pacity  survey  detects  the capacity  enlargement  arising  from  new  investment 
more  accurately  than it does the subtractions  due to retirements  or obso- 
lescence.  The former  involves  money-capital budgeting,  contracting,  and 
spending-while  the latter  does not. There  is no comparable  reason  to be- 
lieve  that  the operating  rate  survey  is biased  in its allowance  for  retirements 
and  obsolescence  since  it represents,  ideally  at least,  a fresh  assessment  each 
year  of the utilization  of available  capacity. 
The capacity  growth  rates  displayed  in Table  2 are  consistent  with  these 
hypotheses  about retirements  and obsolescence:  that they were  unusually 
heavy  during  this period  and that the utilization  survey  detected  this fact 
while  the capacity  survey  failed  to do so. The utilization  survey  recorded  a 
sharp  slowdown  in capacity  growth  after  the mid-1960s,  while  the capacity 
survey  reflected  only  a slight  slowdown  and  recorded  a capacity  growth  rate 
twice  as large  as the utilization  survey  during  the 1969-72  interval. 
Disaggregating  Measures  of Capacity 
As the overall  level  of business  activity  varies,  capacity  pressures  are  not 
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nounced  cyclical  variation  in output  than others,  their  tendency  to do so is 
not strong  enough  to ensure  regularity  in capacity  pressure  across  industries 
from  one  cycle  to another.  Aggregate  measures  of capacity  utilization,  such 
as the widely  reported  measures  of operating  rates  in all manufacturing, 
thus conceal  a great  deal of irregularity  in the position of individual  in- 
dustries.  Yet it may  make  quite  a lot of difference  if the average  operating 
rate for all manufacturing  is a couple of points below full utilization  be- 
cause  most manufacturing  industries  are in that position  rather  than be- 
cause some industries  are operating  at the limits of their capacity  while 
others  suffer  an overhang  of idle facilities.  In the 1973  economy,  informa- 
tion from  a variety  of sources  indicates  that  capacity  limited  the expansion 
of output  in several  industries  such as paper,  petroleum,  steel, and some 
lines of chemicals,  while many others  exhibited  evidence  of ample spare 
capacity. 
The significance  of measures  of capacity  and of capacity  utilization  will 
vary  from  industry  to industry.  Prices  can be expected  to be more  sensitive 
to the degree  of utilization  in some  industries  than  in others.  In sufficiently 
concentrated  industries,  where  firms  aim for a target  rate  of return,  prices 
may even have a negative  relation  to utilization,  rising  when utilization, 
productivity,  and profits  are low. Similarly,  the significance  of utilization 
rates  for explaining  investment  will  differ  among  industries.  In some  indus- 
tries, capacity  represents  a true physical  limit to production.  Those em- 
ploying continuous  process operations,  such as petroleum  and paper, 
typically  use facilities  as intensively  as demand  permits,  running  them 
nearly  twenty-four  hours  a day, seven  days a week.  When  all facilities  are 
running  at these  rates,  a meaningful  physical  limit to capacity  is reached. 
Average  cost curves  may be flat or declining  right  up to this point  in such 
operations.  By contrast,  in others,  such as the automobile  industry,  pro- 
duction  is geared  to a typical  workweek  but is easily  expanded  by running 
production  lines more days or longer  hours  each day. The average  labor 
cost of doing so is higher,  at least after  a point, because  of overtime  pay. 
But other  costs are spread  more widely.  It may be profitable  to expand 
output very substantially  beyond the normal operating  level, with cost 
curves  flat  or  declining  well  past  what  is customarily  regarded  as 100  percent 
of capacity.  The implications,  both for new investment  and for price  pres- 
sures,  are thus widely  different  for petroleum  refining  and for automobile 
production. 
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mits a look at how utilization  affects  the different  industries  and, at the 
same  time, how the alternative  measures  of utilization  fare as forecasting 
variables.  Such analysis  can be helpful  in several  ways in evaluating  the 
merits  of alternative  measures  and  in assessing  the current  state  of capacity 
utilization.  It can identify  the measures  that perform  the best, and the in- 
dustries  for which  correct  measures  of utilization  are  important.  And  it can 
determine  the industries  on which  some agreement  exists  among  the alter- 
native  measures. 
Unfortunately,  the measures  of capacity  and utilization  available  for all 
manufacturing  are not all available  in the same disaggregated  form. The 
Federal  Reserve  Board  index  is disaggregated  only into advanced  and  pri- 
mary processing  industries.  The Wharton  index is thoroughly  disaggre- 
gated,  basically  at the two-digit  industry  level.  The two McGraw-Hill  sur- 
vey measures  are  available  for somewhat  fewer  industries.  In the following 
analysis  comparisons  are  limited  to the  Wharton  and  the  two McGraw-Hill 
measures,  and  among  these,  to industries  for which  data  were  available  for 
at least two of the indexes. 
Predicting Capacity Growth 
High operating  rates  should,  other  things  equal,  induce  firms  to add to 
their  capacity.  A natural  test of the indexes  under  review,  therefore,  is their 
ability to predict  their own capacity  growth rates from their own past 
utilization  rates.  How the three  measures  under  review  fared  in such  a test 
is reported  in Table  4. The  percentage  increase  in capacity  for  each  measure 
was  explained  by past  values  of its own  operating  rates  and  past  increases  in 
output.  Output  change  is included  as a way of capturing  the effect  of ex- 
pected  future  changes  in output  on capacity  decisions.  The exact form of 
the equation  used is shown  in Table  4. The table presents  the t-ratios  of 
the operating  rate  variable  in the equation  explaining  capacity  growth  for 
each of fourteen  industries  as well as for all manufacturing. 
Both McGraw-Hill  measures  explain  themselves  well. The capacity  sur- 
vey measure  registers  a wrong  sign in only one of the fourteen  industries, 
food, and  has a t-ratio  lower  than  2.0 in three  others.  The  utilization  survey 
measure  does  about  as well.  It has  wrong  signs  in two  industries  and  t-ratios 
lower  than  2.0 in only one other.  Both of these  measures  also perform  well 
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Table 4.  Capacity Growth  of Selected Industries  as Explained by 
Own Operating  Rates of Three Indexes 
t-ratio  of operating  rate  variable 
in industry  capacity  equationa 
Standard 
industrial  McGraw-  McGraw- 
classification  Hill-C  Hill-U  Wharton 
code  Industry  index  index  index 
20  Food  -5.0  3.2  -6.5 
22  Textiles  1.3  4.8b  4. 9b 
26  Paper  4.4  -0.5b  -  3.0b 
28  Chemicals  3.2  5.9  -0.4 
29  Petroleum  3.6  3. lb  1.1 
30  Rubber  4.0  2.9  0.6b 
32  Stone,  clay,  and glass  7.7  4. lb  -1.3 
33  Primary metals  4.3b  ...  _3.4 
333-36,  339  Nonferrous  metals  5.Ob  -1.2b 
34, 38  Fabricated metals and instruments  0.6  5. 6b  1 .Ob 
35  Machinery  6.9  0.7  -4.0 
36  Electrical machinery  3.Ob  2.7  -8.4 
371  Motor vehicles  6.9b  3.2  -0.4b 
372-75,  379  Other transportation  equipment  1.0  2.8  -1.1 
All  manufacturing  5.1  5.1  0.2 
Sources: Same as Table 1. 
a.  The capacity equation used was 
Ct  -Ct-4  =  a + b(Ut-3  +  Ut-4  +  Ut-5  +  Ut-6  +  c  Qt3  -Qt-7) 
Ct-4  4  1  Qt-7'  ' 
where 
Ct =  quarterly  capacity 
Ut =  quarterly  operating rate 
Qt =  quarterly  output. 
The period of estimation is 1956:2 to 1972:4. 
b. The output term had the wrong sign in the basic capacity equation. The t-ratio shown is for the operat- 
ing rate term in the equation with the output term omitted. 
The  Wharton  index  fails  in almost  every  industry.  Only  in textiles  does its 
own  estimate  of operating  rates  succeed  in explaining  its estimate  of capac- 
ity growth.  Its operating  rate variable  has the wrong  sign in nine other 
industries  and  t-ratios  less  than  2.0 in the remaining  three  industries.  It also 
has a negligible  coefficient  in its equation  for all manufacturing. 
Predicting  Investment 
For GNP forecasting,  the analyst  is primarily  interested  in predicting 
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causal  relation  between  operating  rates  and  investment  is less precise  than 
the relation  between  operating  rates and capacity  growth  that was just 
analyzed,  investment  is, in most instances,  the primary  action that firms 
can take to expand  capacity.  In practice,  operating  rates are commonly 
used by forecasters  to help explain  investment,  and the ability  of such an 
index  to do so is an important  test of its general  usefulness. 
How  the  three  indexes  fared  in explaining  investment  is shown  in Table  5, 
which  displays  t-ratios  for their  operating  rates  in an investment  equation 
for twelve industries  as well as for all manufacturing.  The equation  ex- 
plained  the ratio of deflated  investment  to output by past values of op- 
erating  rates. Capital  stocks for individual  industries  were  not available, 
so it was  not possible  to try to explain  investment  as a fraction  of the capi- 
tal stock.  The exact  form of the estimating  equation  is given  in the table. 
Table 5.  Performance  of Alternative  Measures of Operating Rates in 
Explaining Investment 
t-ratio  of operating  rate  variable 
in industry  investment  equationa 
Standard 
industrial  McGraw-  McGraw- 
classification  Hill-C  Hill-U  Wharton 
code  Industry  index  index  index 
20  Food  -2.3  1.2  1.4 
22  Textiles  3.2  3.1  6.1 
26  Paper  3.8  4.8  0.2 
28  Chemicals  -2.4  3.7  0.1 
29  Petroleum  0.0  2.9  4.1 
30  Rubber  3.9  2.2  1.0 
32  Stone,  clay, and glass  5.0  7.5  2.2 
33  Primary metals  3.0  n.a.  2.5 
34,38  Fabricated metals and instruments  2.0  3.9  4.7 
35  Machinery  6.4  4.1  4.1 
36  Electrical machinery  2.8  2.7  3.2 
37  Transportation  equipment  5.7  2.3  2.4 
All  manufacturing  7.3  5.3  3.5 
Sources: Same as Table 1. 
a. The equation used is 
It  =  a  +  b  U1(t)  +  U4(t-1)  +  U3(t-1)  +  U2(t-l) 
Qt  4 
where 
It  =  investment in year t 
Qt  output in year t 
UT(t)  =  utilization in the T quarter of year t. 
The equations were estimated for the period 1956-71. 
n.a. Not available. Table  6. Prediction  of Price Changes  in Selected  Industries  from 
Operating  Rates  of Alternative  Indexes 
Coefficient  and t-ratio  (in parentheses) 
of operating  rate variable  in 
industry  price equationa 
Standard  McGraw-  McGraw- 
industrial  Hill-C  Hill-  U  Wharton 
classification  code  Industry  index  index  index 
20  Foodb  -0.048  -0.033  0.090 
(-2.5)  (-0.6)  (1.9) 
22  Textiles  0.1160  0.1270  0.057c, d 
(3.4)  (3.3)  (2.4) 
26  Paper"  0.202  0.236  0.044 
(5.2)  (5.8)  (1.7) 
28  Chemicals  0.010  0.027  0.025 
(1.0)  (1.1)  (1.2) 
29  Petroleum  0.031f  0.050f  0.390 
(0.5)  (0.6)  (2.3) 
30  Rubber  (0.031)0  0.0980  0.120e 
(1.7)  (2.6)  (4.3) 
32  Stone,  clay,  and glass  0.005  0.015  -0.019 
(0.3)  (1.0)  (-0.9) 
331,332  Iron and steelg  0.073  ...  0.064h 
(4.4)  (3.2) 
333-36,  339  Nonferrous  metalsg  0.198d  0.196d  0.134d,h 
(3.6)  (3.3)  (2.8) 
35  Machinery  0.031  0.035  0.021 
(3.6)  (2.7)  (2.6) 
36  Electrical machinery  0.005  0.017  0.007 
(0.3)  (1.0)  (0.5) 
371  Motor  vehicles  -0.034  -0.049  -0.038 
(-3.6)  (-3.8)  (-3.6) 
Sources: Price data were assembled by Richard Benson of Harvard University from wholesale price in- 
dexes. Wage data are from Employment  and Earnings, various issues. The sources of the indexes are the 
same as in Table 1. 
a.  The equation used is 
Pt  =a  +  bU laggedt + c  W  +  d  Pt 
p  laggedt-i  w  laggedt-1  P  laggedg-l 
where the time interval is one quarter  and 
Pt =  the wholesale price of industry output 
Ut =  capacity utilization, scaled as a decimal (for example, 0.90) 
wg = straight-time hourly earnings in the industry 
Pt  =  the price of material inputs to the industry 
p laggedt  =  O.4pt  +  0.3pt-1  +  0.2pt_2  +  0.1pt_3,  and  w  lagged,  U  lagged,  and  P  lagged  are  defined 
analogously. 
The period of estimation is 1955:3 to 1971:2. 
b.  Data on wages were not available. 
c.  The input price variable entered the equation with the wrong sign. The coefficient shown is  for  the 
equation with input prices dropped. 
d.  The wage variable entered the equation with the wrong sign and was dropped. 
e.  Data on input prices were not available. 
f.  The utilization rate variable is for petroleum refining only (SIC industries 291 and 299). 
g.  The wage variable is for primary  metals (SIC 33). 
h.  The utilization rate for primary metals (SIC 33) is used. George L. Perry  727 
The Wharton  index of operating  rates explains  investment  much  more 
successfully  than it explains  its own estimate  of capacity  growth.  None of 
the indexes  works well in the food industry,  and Wharton  displays  a t- 
statistic  greater  than 2.0 in eight of the remaining  eleven  industries  as well 
as in all manufacturing.  It still does not perform  quite as well as the two 
McGraw-Hill  measures.  The utilization  series  has a significant  coefficient 
in every  industry  but  food, while  the  capacity  series  fails  in two others.  They 
also  have  noticeably  higher  t-ratios  in the all-manufacturing  equation.  But 
the Wharton  index explains  investment  well, and, in the present  form of 
the equation,  only slightly  less well than its competitors. 
Predicting  Price  Changes 
All three measures  of operating  rates prove useful in predicting  price 
changes.  Over  all, the Wharton  measure  does as well as the two McGraw- 
Hill  surveys,  and  no one of the three  is clearly  superior  in predicting  prices. 
A comparison  of their  performances  is provided  in Table  6, where  the co- 
efficients  and t-statistics  for the operating  rate terms are compared  in 
equations  for twelve  separate  industries. 
All the price  equations  were  estimated  for periods  ending  in the second 
quarter  of 1971.  Data were  available  to start  the estimation  period,  with 
three-quarter  lags, in the third quarter  of 1955. Ending the estimation 
period  in mid-1971  avoided  the Phase  I, II, and III price  control  episodes. 
Since  there  is no way to know  the effect  of controls  on prices  in individual 
industries  during  this era of abruptly  changing  wage-price  policies,  esti- 
mates  of normal  effects  would be distorted.  A utilization  index that was 
"too  low"  during  the initial  freeze  and  Phase  II would  predict  prices  better 
than  it should  in that  period.  An index  that  was "too high"  might  do better 
than  it should  during  the Phase  III stage  of suddenly  absent  controls.  Con- 
fining  the estimation  to the years before Phase I avoids making  special 
allowances  in the equations  for all these changes.  During  the wage-price 
guidepost  period  of 1962-68,  restraints  were  much  milder  and, on the evi- 
dence  as  I interpret  it, acted  mainly  by moderating  wage  increases  and  keep- 
ing prices  in step with wages.  Since  cost changes  are accounted  for in the 
price  equations  estimated  here,  little room remains  for a separate  guide- 
post  effect.  In a few industries  some  effect  may have  been felt, particularly 
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For each industry,  basic  price  equations  were  estimated  explaining  the 
change  in the price  of the industry's  output  by the level  of capacity  utiliza- 
tion, the change  in the average  wage  in the industry  (measured  by straight- 
time hourly  earnings  of production  workers),  and the change  in the price 
of the industry's  material  inputs.  In two cases,  data on wages  or materials 
prices  were  not available.  And in some others,  one or both took on the 
wrong sign and the equation  was reestimated  without them. The three 
change  variables  had the form, 
xt/(0.4xt-,  +  0.3xt-2  +  0.2xt-3  +  O.1Xt-4). 
When  the variable  is changing  at a steady  rate,  this can be thought  of as 
approximately  1 +  1/2 (annual  rate  of increase).  Thus  the coefficient  on the 
utilization  rate in this equation  can be thought of as approximately  one- 
half the elasticity  of the variable  with respect  to the utilization  rate, al- 
though  the precise  lag structure  is rather  complicated. 
In addition  to the industries  for which  statistics  are  reported  in Table  6, 
it was  possible  to estimate  price  equations  for six other  two-digit  industries 
-tobacco,  apparel,  lumber,  furniture,  leather, and fabricated  metals- 
using  just Wharton  utilization  data.  Judged  by t-statistics  greater  than 2.0, 
utilization  rates  were  successful  variables  in all cases  but apparel. 
Besides  the equation  set forth  in Table  6, two alternative  forms  of price 
equations  were estimated  for each of the industries.  Since the level of 
utilization  rates  is used  in the Table  6 equations,  the estimates  imply  that 
in a steady  state in which  the utilization  rate was unchanged,  the rate of 
price increase  would be unchanged.  Since the rates of change of input 
prices  and of wages  in the industry  are measured  separately  by the other 
explanatory  variables  in the equation,  this implication  is implausible.  One 
should  not expect  margins  to keep expanding  or contracting  indefinitely. 
Of course,  one would  not expect  such  a steady  state  to prevail.  Expanding 
margins  would be expected  to induce firms to expand capacity  faster, 
thereby  reducing  operating  rates. The equations  reported  in Table 6 are 
too simple  to capture  all such effects.  One might want  to look for an in- 
dependent  effect  on prices  from  changes  in utilization  rather  than from  its 
level. Quite  apart  from  this argument,  in industries  whose  pricing  is char- 
acterized  by market-clearing  behavior,  one would expect  the change in 
utilization,  rather  than its level,  to explain  price  movements. 
Equations  including  the change  in utilization  were estimated  for each 
industry  and with each measure  of utilization.  Of the industries  shown  in George L. Perry  729 
Table 6, this variation was successful in textiles and petroleum; it also suc- 
ceeded in the lumber and leather industries, for which only Wharton utili- 
zation data were available. 
Alternative equations were also estimated using a nonlinear form of the 
utilization rate, 1/(1.2  -  U), where the  U term was a distributed lag as 
before. In the denominator of this expression, 1.2 is used to avoid too much 
nonlinearity and the explosion of the term to infinity as utilization rates 
occasionally reached 1.0. It seems likely that utilization effects on prices 
are nonlinear, but these equations were virtually indistinguishable from 
those reported in Table 6. 
The coefficients for two industries deserve special comment. Utilization 
had a significant  negative effect on prices for motor vehicles, using all three 
measures, and for tobacco, for which only a Wharton estimate is available. 
It seems sensible to interpret this result as evidence of pricing based on a 
target rate of return in these industries.16  It is much less likely that the 
significant negative coefficient on food estimated using the McGraw-Hill 
capacity survey can be interpreted in this way, since this industry is not as 
concentrated as autos and tobacco. While the equation reported in Table 6 
cannot be considered an optimal pricing equation, it does seem to capture 
the importance of utilization rates once costs have been accounted for, and 
does provide a fairly straightforward comparison of the utilization rate 
measures. On the basis of these results, a price forecaster would want to 
pick and choose among the alternative measures of utilization. No doubt, 
the results for any one index or for any one industry could be improved 
with a more elaborate specification of the price equation. But even with the 
simple form used here, all three of the measures do well enough to be taken 
seriously. 
Why does the Wharton index do as well as any in explaining prices when 
it failed in explaining capacity growth and was not quite up to its competi- 
tors in explaining investment? An explanation seems to lie in the fact that 
most of the price increase in the period 1954:4 through 1971:2 occurred 
during the years 1966-71. As Table 3 showed, manufacturing operating 
rates by all four measures are highly correlated with each other in this 
interval. Wharton's  jump to a new plateau of operating rates relative to the 
16. Richard  Benson of Harvard  University,  who estimated  some of the price equa- 
tions for this paper,  also reports  this result  for autos and tobacco in equations  that in- 
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other  measures  in 1966  does not interfere  with  its predictive  ability  in price 
equations. 
Operating  Rate  Levels 
How  tight  has  capacity  utilization  been  in recent  quarters?  Before  search- 
ing for the elusive  answer  to that question,  some  judgments  must  be made 
about  the operating  rates  shown  by the different  measures.  At a disaggre- 
gated level, the candidates  are the two McGraw-Hill  measures  and the 
Wharton  index. 
Several  of the utilization  rate series  calculated  from the McGraw-Hill 
capacity survey exhibit marked  time trends over most of the 1954-72 
period.  In some industries,  the trends  were so pronounced  as to swamp 
any cyclical  variation  in operating  rates: in food, utilization  declined  in 
all but  two years  of the 1955-72  interval;  in chemicals,  it rose  in all but one 
year of the 1956-68  interval;  in rubber,  it rose in all but one year of the 
1955-69  interval. 
These  cases,  and  a few others  that are  not so conspicuous,  cast  doubt  on 
the reliability  of the capacity  survey  for measuring  the level  of utilization 
despite  its usefulness  for other  purposes.  It is significant  that two principal 
users  of this survey  benchmark  it periodically  to utilization  rates  from  the 
McGraw-Hill  utilization  survey.  As noted earlier,  the FRB capacity  index 
is constructed  (in part)  by adjusting  the capacity  survey  to match  the trend 
of capacity  growth  implied  in the utilization  survey.  McGraw-Hill  itself 
derives  a special  series  of monthly  utilization  rates  by a method  that links 
capacity  growth  estimates  from  the capacity  survey  to utilization  rates  from 
the utilization  survey.17  The particular  way in which  these estimates  are 
linked  does not equate  utilization  from  the two sources  every  year; but it 
keeps the capacity  survey estimate from wandering  very far over any 
period  of time. 
The equation  results  reported  in Tables  4, 5, and 6 show  that operating 
rates  from  the capacity  survey  can be useful  predictors.  In such  equations, 
exponential  drifts  in the operating  rate  index  can  be compensated  for  in the 
estimated  constant  term  of the regression.  But the level of operating  rates 
17. See, for example,  the bulletin,  "McGraw-Hill  Measure  of the Industrial  Operating 
Rate" (McGraw-Hill  Publications  Company,  June 1972; processed). George L. Perry  731 
derived  from this survey  cannot be relied on for assessing  the current 
situation. 
That  leaves  the Wharton  index  and  the McGraw-Hill  utilization  survey. 
Table  7 compares  operating  rates  recorded  by these two measures  for in- 
dividual  industries.  It shows  the peak rates achieved  during  the first  half 
of 1973  and the difference  between  these rates  and the peaks  achieved  in 
the 1968-69  and 1966  expansionary  periods. 
WHARTON 
As a result of the considerable  rise in production  that had occurred 
through  mid-1973,  most industries  in the Wharton  measure  showed op- 
erating  rates  at 100  at that time. It would  be comforting  to believe  in such 
an apparently  well-balanced  expansion,  but no other evidence  supports 
such  a view.  The  table  also shows  that  by Wharton  data,  operating  rates  in 
1973  have been above 1966  peaks in most industries.  Yet there is wide- 
spread  agreement  that capacity  was being utilized  very intensely  in most 
industries  during  at least part of 1966.18  These  facts, revealed  in Table  7, 
reflect  the two basic  weaknesses  of the Wharton  methodology:  its inability 
to distinguish  any difference  in the intensity  of utilization  achieved  at dif- 
ferent  cyclical  peaks;  and  its need  to wait  on a subsequent  peak  before  set- 
tling on what operating  rates have been-even  by its own definitions- 
during  an  expansion.  If the present  expansion  were  to continue  at an above- 
average  pace  for some  time,  the current  capacity  estimates  in the Wharton 
index  would  be revised  upward  and  the estimates  of recent  operating  rates 
would  be reduced. 
MCGRAW-HILL  UTILIZATION 
All in all, the McGraw-Hill  utilization  survey  seems  the most believable 
of the available  measures.  Unlike  the capacity  survey,  it can be expected  to 
be reasonably  free of drift over time. A priori, one would expect that 
changes  in obsolescence  of facilities,  in their capital-labor  ratios, or in 
other  characteristics  of production  techniques  should  be accounted  for by 
18. This is true even though cyclical peaks were not recorded  in every  industry  that 
year; otherwise  Table 7 would never  indicate a 1966 peak operating  rate below a 1973 
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respondents  to this survey  at least as well as they would  be by other  avail- 
able measures.  And unlike  the Wharton  index, the utilization  survey  is 
capable  of distinguishing  among  the degrees  of intensity  of utilization  at 
different  cyclical  peaks.  The utilization  survey  performed  as well  as or bet- 
ter  than  the other  measures  in explaining  capacity  growth,  investment,  and 
prices.  Thus there  is reason  to prefer  the picture  of 1973  operating  rates 
that emerges  from  this survey. 
The  utilization  survey  gives  a picture  of recent  operating  rates  noticeably 
different  from  that  provided  by the Wharton  index.  In the first  half  of 1973, 
several  industries  experienced  exceptionally  high operating  rates  by histori- 
cal standards;  but more  industries  had operating  rates  below 1966  peaks 
than above  them. The average  operating  rate for all manufacturing  con- 
ceals a considerable  dispersion  among  rates  in individual  industries.  And 
if information  were available  at a more disaggregated  level, it would  un- 
doubtedly  reveal  capacity  bottlenecks  in parts of various  industries  that 
are  concealed  at the two-digit  level  of aggregation.  The  provision  of only a 
single  operating  rate  for an industry  with  as varied  a product  line as chemi- 
cals has to be counted  a serious  shortcoming  of available  statistics. 
While  high operating  rates  are  not as pervasive  in the utilization  survey 
as in the Wharton  index,  the economy  operated  in the first  half  of 1973  with 
less spare industrial  capacity  than one might have expected,  given the 
modest  growth  in industrial  output  since  the mid-1960s.  Overall  capacity 
has grown  slowly  in recent  years.  The FRB index  and the capacity  survey 
fail to measure  this slowdown-  and record  far more  spare  capacity  in 1973 
than they should  (see Figure  1). 
Price-Sensitive  Operating  Rates 
In late 1972  and  in 1973  a particular  need  arose  for a measure  that  would 
answer  the questions  of whether  capacity  utilization  pressures  were  causing 
inflation,  and if so, where.  For this purpose,  the results  here show that a 
measure  of utilization  in all manufacturing  was  not very  useful.  Price  equa- 
tions indicated  that utilization  rates  matter  far more  for predicting  prices 
in some  industries  than  in others.  The analyst  can work  directly  with  indi- 
vidual equations  for individual  industries  to predict  price effects.  But a 
summary  index  can convey  the general  picture  of tightness  or slack  that 
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ual industry  equations  summarized  in Table  6. Such  an index  is formed  by 
weighting  the utilization  rate  for each  industry  by the relative  importance 
of output  in that  industry  and the coefficient  in the price  equation  for that 
industry. 
Three  such indexes of operating  rates in price-sensitive  industries  are 
shown  in Table  8. The  three  indexes  arise  from  using  the McGraw-Hill  uti- 
lization  index  alone, the Wharton  index  alone, and a mixture  of the two. 
For reasons  already  given,  the McGraw-Hill  utilization  index  is preferred 
for comparing  operating  rates  at successive  cyclical  peaks.  However,  this 
index is not available  separately  for several  important  industries  and the 
Wharton  index did outperform  McGraw-Hill  in the price  equations  in a 
few  industries  for which  both  were  available.  Thus  data  from  both are  used 
in the  Table  8 measures.  When  Wharton  data  are  used,  no index  is presented 
for years  before  1966;  the Wharton  index  moved  to a higher  plateau  rela- 
tive to the McGraw-Hill  then, making  comparisons  with the 1950s  espe- 
cially  suspect. 
Table  8. Operating  Rates  in Price-Sensitive  Industries,  by Three  Measures, 
Selected  Quarters  of High  Utilization,  1955-73 
Percent 
Year  and  McGraw-Hill-U  Wharton 
quarter  indexa  indexb  Combined  index" 
1955:4  92.9  ...  ... 
1956:1  92.9  ...  ... 
1959:1  84.0  ...  ... 
2  86.9  ...  ... 
1966:2  95.9  96.4  96.1 
3  96.0  96.5  95.9 
1969:1  90.3  96.0  93.2 
2  90.1  96.1  92.8 
1972:4  89.4  96.3  92.9 
1973:1  90.2  96.7  93.2 
2  90.2  97.9  93.8 
Sources: Same as Table 1. 
a.  The McGraw-Hill-U  index includes the textile, paper, rubber, nonferrous metals, and nonelectrical 
machinery industries. 
b. The Wharton index includes the textile, lumber, furniture, petroleum, rubber, leather, primary  metals, 
fabricated metals, and nonelectrical machinery industries. Wharton utilization in the primary metals in- 
dustry is used once with weights for iron and steel, and once with weights for nonferrous metals. 
c.  The combined index includes McGraw-Hill-U  utilization rates for the textile, paper, rubber, non- 
ferrous metals, and nonelectrical machinery industries; and Wharton utilization rates for petroleum, iron 
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An industry  was included  in a Table 8 index  if utilization  produced  a 
t-statistic  greater  than  2.0 in the price  equations  summarized  in Table  6. By 
restricting  the index  to nonfood  industries,  I avoided  the uncertainty  about 
an equation  for food. And I omitted  the motor  vehicles  industry,  with its 
significant  negative  coefficient,  on the grounds  that the index  is designed 
not to forecast  average  price  changes,  which  would  call  for including  nega- 
tive as well as positive  effects  of utilization,  but rather  to indicate  roughly 
the  upward  price  pressures  arising  from  high  operating  rates.  Table  8 shows 
the index  values  for the three  most recently  available  quarters  and for two 
peak  quarters  from  past episodes  of high utilization  rates. 
The  index  based  on the McGraw-Hill  measure,  shown  in the first  column, 
has  the fewest  number  of industries.  It shows  that price-sensitive  industries 
in recent  quarters  had about  the same operating  rates as they had at the 
1969  peaks,  but were  well  below  the 1966  peaks.  The 1966  peaks  are  notice- 
ably higher  than any others,  including  those of 1955-56.  The Wharton- 
based  index  shown  in the second  column  is constructed  from  a larger  num- 
ber of industries.  Unfortunately,  it clearly  displays  the tendency  of the 
Wharton  methodology  to make  all peaks  look alike. 
The  index  in the third  column  combines  the industries  in the McGraw- 
Hill index  with any others  that show significant  effects  in equations  with 
the Wharton  measures,  using  Wharton  utilization  rates.  In addition  to the 
industries  for which  McGraw-Hill  utilization  estimates  are  available,  it in- 
cludes  petroleum,  steel, lumber,  leather,  fabricated  metals,  and furniture. 
Thus  it provides  substantially  better  coverage  by including  some  additional 
key industries,  although  with the Wharton  utilization  data. However,  for 
the important  petroleum,  steel, and lumber  industries,  the high operating 
rates  reported  by Wharton  are  supported  by  journalistic  accounts  and  other 
sources.  In recent  quarters,  this combined  index  is very  near  1969  levels  but 
still  below  those of 1966.  Industrial  capacity  pressures  on prices  have  been 
evident;  but  the pressures  have  not been  exceptionally  intense  for a period 
of booming  business  activity. 
Major  Materials  Industries 
A good  deal  of attention  has been  given  recently  to capacity  pressures  in 
some  major  materials  industries  that  have  been  a special  feature  of the cur- 
rent  expansion.  Edmonson,  as  noted  above,  has  reported  the  reconstruction 
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Table  9. Operating  Rates  in Major  Materials  Industries,  Three 
Measures,  Selected  Quarters,  1955-73 
Percent 
Federal  Reserve 
Year  and  Board  special  McGraw-Hill-U  Wharton 
quarter  indexa  indexb  indexb 
1955:4  91.7  94.3  ... 
1956:1  93.3  94.9  ... 
1966:2  92.0  96.5  96.9 
3  92.0  96.6  97.7 
1969:3  91.1  91.3  98.4 
4  91.6  90.6  98.7 
1972:4  92.4  91.3  99.1 
1973:1  93.8  91.7  99.4 
2  94.4  91.8  99.5 
Sources: Column 1, Nathan Edmonson, "Capacity Utilization in Major Materials Industries," Federal 
Reserve  Bulletin, Vol. 59 (August 1973), p. 564; columns 2 and 3, see Table 1. 
a.  The FRB special index is based on trade association statistics and is described in the text. 
b.  The industries included in the McGraw-Hill utilization index are textiles, paper, petroleum refining, 
and nonferrous metals; the Wharton index, in addition, includes lumber and steel. 
to be maintained  regularly  by the Federal Reserve.19  The index is a weighted 
average of utilization measures  compiled separately  for twelve manufactur- 
ing industries: basic steel, primary aluminum, primary copper, man-made 
fibers, paper, paperboard, wood pulp, softwood plywood, cement, petro- 
leum refining, broadwoven fabrics, and yarn spinning. These are small 
industries compared with all of manufacturing, accounting for about 8 
percent of total value added in manufacturing; but they are thought to be 
of a strategic importance that is disproportionate to their size. The utiliza- 
tion index for each industry is assembled from estimates of capacity and 
physical units of output reported by industry trade associations and gov- 
ernment agencies. The data are fragmentary and not always available an- 
nually;  but  they  offer an  interesting alternative to  the  other available 
measures of capacity. 
The Edmonson index, denoted FRB  special, is shown in Table 9, to- 
gether with indexes based on the McGraw-Hill utilization data and the 
Wharton data. The latter two are attempts to cover the same industries as 
the FRB special, but clearly provide only loose approximations. They are 
19. Edmonson,  "Capacity  Utilization." George L. Perry  737 
based on those two-digit industries that encompass the industries in the 
FRB special index, but they encompass many other industries as well. 
The FRB special index has received attention because it indicates that 
the major materials  industries  experienced,  in the first two quarters  of 1973, 
operating rates higher than any previously recorded in the postwar period. 
The Wharton-based  index, again not shown for years before 1966, supports 
this picture of exceptionally high recent operating rates in these industries. 
The major materials index based on the McGraw-Hill data tells a sub- 
stantially different  story. Recent operating rates are equal to or above those 
reached in 1969, but comfortably below the 1966 peaks. Again, as in the 
index of price-sensitive industries, this index omits the lumber and steel 
industries.  This omission could give it some downward bias, although those 
industries  had high operating  rates in 1966 as well as 1973. Of the industries 
included, textiles and nonferrous metals operated at noticeably lower levels 
in  1973 than at the two previous peaks, according to  the McGraw-Hill 
index. 
The source of this discrepancy in the indexes of Table 9 is difficult to 
identify. The FRB special is of unknown quality. Analysts could evaluate 
it more easily if data for its constituent industries were available separately. 
The index based on McGraw-Hill data has substantially  different  coverage. 
Its reading of present utilization rates is not inconsistent with the possibility 
that significant bottlenecks exist in some parts of the industries that it does 
include. The ambiguous results of Table 9 reemphasize the need for more 
disaggregation  in reliable measures of utilization. But detecting bottlenecks 
can probably never be accomplished by looking  at capacity utilization 
measures. Bottlenecks can occur in too many places and at too detailed an 
industry level. And they can arise from raw materials bottlenecks more 
readily than from shortages of manufacturing capacity. 
Advanced  and Primary Processing Industries 
A special feature of the Federal Reserve's regular index is its disaggrega- 
tion into primary and advanced processing industries. This feature has at- 
tracted attention because, after reaching  comparable  levels at their 1966 and 
1969 peaks, operating rates in these two categories diverged sharply in re- 
cent years. By the end of 1972, the moderate operating rates recorded in the 
FRB all-manufacturing  index represented an average of exceptionally low 
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primary processing industries. This  divergence continued  through  the 
second quarter of 1973 in the FRB index. 
In Table 10, the McGraw-Hill utilization rates are used to construct in- 
dexes comparable to the FRB  measures for advanced and primary pro- 
cessing industries. These show a rather surprising disagreement with the 
FRB index. By the second quarter of  1973, operating rates in advanced 
processing industries were at levels similar to the 1966 peaks as measured 
by McGraw-Hill rather than at the recession levels indicated by the FRB 
index. For primary processing industries, the measure based on McGraw- 
Hill data shows somewhat lower operating rates in 1973 than the FRB in- 
dex, but the disagreement is not great. And since the lumber and steel 
industries are omitted by McGraw-Hill, the two  measures can be con- 
sidered in substantial agreement here. 
Apparently most of the error  that has accumulated in recent years in the 
FRB index is concentrated in the advanced processing industries. As the 
Table 10.  Operating  Rates in Advanced  and Primary Processing 
Industries,  Two Measures, Selected Quarters, 1955-73 
Percent 
Advanced  processing  industries  Primary  processing  industries 
Year  Federal  Re-  Year  Federal  Re- 
and  serve  Board  McGraw-  and  serve  Board  McGraw- 
quarter  index  Hill-  U indexa  quarter  index  Hill-  U inidexa 
1955:3  88.0  87.8  1955:3  95.0  92.4 
4  89.1  89.3  4  95.3  94.0 
1960:1  82.9  83.4  1960:1  86.4  85.9 
2  81.4  80.8  2  80.9  83.9 
1966:3  92.0  89.3  1966:2  92.9  93.4 
4  92.2  88.5  3  92.7  93.5 
1969:1  87.1  85.4  1969:2  88.7  88.0 
2  86.2  84.9  3  88.9  87.8 
1972:4  77.8  84.6  1972:4  88.3  85.8 
1973:1  79.1  87.1  1973:1  89.6  87.2 
2  79.7  88.9  2  90.1  88.0 
Sources: The FRB indexes were provided by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The 
other indexes were derived from data provided by McGraw-Hill, cited in Table 1. 
a.  The lumber and steel industries are not included in the McGraw-Hill utilization primary processing 
index; the tobacco, apparel, furniture, printing and publishing, leather, and miscellaneous manufacturing 
industries are not  included in  the McGraw-Hill utilization advanced processing index.  Chemicals are 
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FRB methodology is supposed to benchmark to the McGraw-Hill utiliza- 
tion survey, this part of the index simply must be regarded  as badly in error. 
The Inflation  of 1973 
When prices started accelerating in 1973, many observers quickly drew 
the inference that the U.S. economy was straining its productive capacity. 
According to the present analysis, this inference  seriously overstates  the case 
as far as plant and equipment facilities in manufacturing are concerned. 
Operating rates in manufacturing have risen substantially in many indus- 
tries since early in 1973 when the alarm was first sounded. Manufacturing 
firms added 277,000 workers to their payrolls between the first and third 
quarters of the year (seasonally adjusted) and durable goods  output ex- 
panded at an 8.1 percent annual rate over the interval. But a more serious 
capacity problem emerged in 1973 than one may have had reason to expect 
from any projections made a few years ago. 
By the measure  that comes out best in the present analysis, the McGraw- 
Hill utilization survey, capacity growth has been slow in recent years. In 
most industries, operating rates were higher in the second quarter of 1973 
than in mid-1969, in contrast with the 4.9 percent unemployment rate in 
the second quarter of 1973 against 3.5 percent in 1969. Furthermore, the 
distribution of operating  rates in 1973  was quite uneven, with key industries 
such as steel and petroleum producing at capacity while others operated 
with considerably underutilized facilities. Accelerated economic obsoles- 
cence and an unanticipated mix of final demands stemming from rapidly 
shifting international trade patterns presumably contributed to the current 
capacity situation. 
Yet granting this, manufacturing capacity problems can hardly account 
for much of the inflation. In the first half of  1973, industrial wholesale 
prices rose at a 12.7 percent annual rate, a sharp acceleration from the 2.5 
percent rate of increase experienced  during  the preceding  six-month period. 
Yet evidence from the measures constructed here indicates that operating 
rates in sensitive industries have been high, but not as high as in earlier 
periods when prices were rising much less. Shortages have occurred, but 
primarily in raw materials rather than in industrial capacity. Wholesale 
prices of industrial materials rose at a 36 percent annual rate in the first six 
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price controls constrained the rise in finished goods prices. The combina- 
tion of increases in materials costs and the end of Phase II price controls 
are the main causes of the 1973 price explosion. Any additional contribu- 
tion to the inflation from the relatively high operating rates in manufactur- 
ing was minor. 
Conclusions 
Each of the four available measures of operating rates in manufacturing 
-compiled  by  the  Federal Reserve Board,  by  McGraw-Hill  from  its 
utilization and capacity surveys, and by the Wharton School-exhibits  dif- 
ferent characteristics. Some of the measures appear to  be in substantial 
error in their picture of available industrial capacity in 1973. The FRB in- 
dex was designed to combine information from capital stock data with in- 
formation from the McGraw-Hill capacity survey to estimate year-to-year 
changes in  capacity, with  the  estimation  benchmarked to  evidence on 
capacity growth from the McGraw-Hill utilization survey. But the index 
has wandered away from its benchmark to the utilization survey in recent 
years and understates current operating rates in manufacturing. The error 
is concentrated in the advanced processing industries portion of the index 
where, by the middle of 1973, the FRB operating rate of 80 percent was 
some 10 percent too low. To get the index back on track, the link between 
the two estimates of year-to-year changes and the benchmark  series should 
be redesigned  so that the index is brought nearer  its current  benchmark  and 
is not allowed to wander away again. 
The other three measures of capacity and utilization are available at a 
more disaggregated level and have been analyzed for their ability to help 
the economic forecaster. All three indexes prove useful in measuring the 
effect of utilization rates on inflation and on business investment spending, 
two important concerns of the forecaster. But they differ in other char- 
acteristics and are not equally reliable for comparing utilization rates in 
separate business cycles. 
The Wharton index provides the most thorough industry detail of the 
three. It is constructed, basically, by defining cyclical peaks in output as an 
industry's capacity and connecting successive peaks to establish the growth 
path of capacity for each industry. This simplicity of construction is Whar- 
ton's great advantage and the methodology has been used to create utiliza- George L. Perry  741 
tion measures  for  industries  outside  manufacturing  in the United  States  and 
for industries  in other  industrialized  nations  around  the world.  Its major 
drawback  is its inability  to distinguish  any difference  in the intensity  of 
utilization  at different  peaks  in an industry's  output.  This  makes  the index 
of little  value  for  comparing  utilization  rates  from  one business  cycle  to the 
next. In addition,  the Wharton  index suffers  from the disadvantage  that 
before  a new peak  is established  during  an expansion  period,  its estimates 
of utilization  are  preliminary. 
The McGraw-Hill  capacity  survey  displays  substantial  time  trends  in its 
implied  measure  of operating  rates. These arise  because  any bias in the 
annual  estimate  of capacity  growth  as measured  by the survey  accumulates 
through  time.  In addition,  respondents  to the capacity  survey  seem  to have 
failed  to detect  the slowdown  in capacity  growth  that other  evidence  sug- 
gests  has occurred  in recent  years. 
The  McGraw-Hill  utilization  survey  turns  out  to have  a cyclical  bias  such 
that capacity  growth  is overstated,  and the rise in operating  rates  under- 
stated,  in periods  when  output  grows  rapidly,  with  the reverse  being  true  in 
periods of slow output growth. Respondents  to the survey apparently 
"find"  capacity  when output grows rapidly,  and "lose" it when output 
growth  slows.  Such  a bias  in a survey  can  be adjusted  for; and  even  without 
adjustment,  the utilization  survey  is useful  for comparing  utilization  rates 
at successive  business  cycle  peaks  or at other  roughly  comparable  stages  of 
successive  business  expansions  and  contractions.  Thus  it is the most useful 
measure  for comparing  1973  operating  rates  with  previous  periods  of rapid 
business expansion. 
TODAY'S  ECONOMY 
Capacity  in manufacturing  has grown  slowly  in recent  years-at  only a 
2.8 percent  annual  rate  since 1969,  according  to the McGraw-Hill  utiliza- 
tion survey.  As a result,  operating  rates  today  are  substantially  higher  than 
one might  have expected  in view of the modest growth  rate in industrial 
output over this period. However,  output was pushing  against  capacity 
limits  in only a few industries  during  1973.  What supply  problems  have 
appeared  have arisen  from shortages  in raw materials  and from isolated 
rather  than widespread  shortages  in industrial  capacity. 
Similarly,  an explanation  of the rapid run-up  in industrial  wholesale 
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shortage  of manufacturing  capacity  but  in the end  of Phase  II price  controls 
coupled  with the spectacular  rise in raw materials  prices,  which  climbed 
rapidly  throughout  1972  and accelerated  to a 36 percent  annual  rate  of in- 
crease  in the first  half of 1973.  Throughout  1973,  average  operating  rates 
in manufacturing  were  still substantially  below  those of 1966.  And despite 
high  operating  rates  in a few  industries,  capacity  shortages  can account  for 
only a very  minor  part  of the price  explosion  that has occurred. 